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Abstract 
 
The draft 2017 Cybersecurity Curricula, also 
called CSEC2017, is being developed to provide 
guidelines for cybersecurity curricula development. 
One component, the Knowledge Areas, includes 
Knowledge Units. This terminology is the same as is 
used for the U.S. NSA/DHS Centers of Academic 
Excellence in various disciplines of cybersecurity. The 
two are different, yet complementary. In order to aid 
faculty and others in understanding the difference 
between the two programs, this paper explores both the 
CSEC2017 and CAE academic designation criteria, 
and compares and contrasts them.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Two major academic projects are working on 
academic curriculum issues associated with 
cybersecurity curricula. There has been confusion 
about the objectives of each of these projects and the 
role they play in assisting educators to create 
appropriate cybersecurity curricula. The first of these 
projects is the Cybersecurity Curricula 2017 
Curriculum Guidelines for Post-Secondary Degree 
Programs in Cybersecurity (CSEC2017), a curricular 
guidance effort for the broad field of cybersecurity. 
The second is the Center of Academic Excellence 
Knowledge Unit program for the CAE CDE program 
(KU), a community driven effort to create a list of 
prescriptive educational elements describing a 
cybersecurity program in an educational setting.  
Cybersecurity is a broad set of disciplines, with a 
body of knowledge that spans multiple distinct 
educational areas and is intertwined with virtually 
every aspect of our information age. What began as a 
computer science and computer engineering discipline 
has spread into a wide range of disciplines. Today, 
there is a need for cybersecurity-educated professionals 
in a wide range of jobs [11].  Educational institutions 
have responded with cybersecurity education programs 
in a wide array of disciplines beyond the original 
computer science and engineering disciplines. 
Business, information systems, information 
technology, law, political science, psychology, and 
interdisciplinary efforts including mathematics and 
physics have joined into the disciplines that have 
graduates entering the workforce as cybersecurity 
workers. This has created a need to define what 
belongs in a cybersecurity curriculum and how to 
assess curricular efforts with respect to producing 
employment ready students. 
There is a known shortage of cybersecurity 
professionals, both in the government and the private 
sector [3, 6]. The shortage has been raised to national 
importance by both the current and previous US 
administrations, each time calling for greater 
workforce development in cybersecurity [15, 16]. 
Cybersecurity education has a number of challenges in 
meeting the workforce needs. [5] Many of these issues 
have existed for years. Continual efforts by the US 
government in the form of the NIST-led National 
Initiative on Cybersecurity Education (NIST NICE) 
[12, 14] and the NSA/DHS effort with Centers of 
Academic Excellence in Cyber Defense Education 
(CAE-CD) [4, 10] have made a dent in the problem, 
but for academia to fid and shift resources into 
developing and implementing new curricula takes time 
and resources. Aligning academia educational output 
and industry needs in a changing environment has been 
a challenge for decades and in cybersecurity this has 
been noted for at least 20 years [1]. A recent 
academically led effort, CSEC2017, to develop 
curricular guidance in cybersecurity education has 
created what may be the missing piece for academics 
to properly advance academic programs to meet the 
needs of graduates and industry. [8] 
The previously mentioned initiatives from the 
government, the CAE and NICE programs, initially 
were targeted to meet specific hiring needs of the 
federal government. This led to problems with 
academics adopting them directly for classroom use, as 
they were far from curricula guidance and targeted 
specific training as opposed to education [2]. Both of 
these programs have undergone updates in the past 
couple of years. This paper examines the knowledge 
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unit development process of the NSA/DHS CAE-CD 
program, comparing and contrasting it with the 
CSEC2017 effort. 
The ACM, IEEE Computer Society, AIS SIGSEC, 
and IFIP WG 11.8 started the CSEC2017 Joint Task 
Force on Cybersecurity Education (JTF) in 2015.  Its 
goal is to “develop comprehensive curricular guidance 
in cybersecurity education that will support future 
program development and associated educational 
efforts at the post-secondary level” ([8], p. 8). The 
guidance document, called CSEC2017, presents 
important areas of knowledge in the field of 
cybersecurity as well as a framework providing 
structure [8]. The framework provides guidance for 
curriculum developers to determine which areas of 
knowledge are most critical for their discipline or 
professional competence. They can then emphasize 
those aspects in greater depth than the other knowledge 
areas while ensuring they cover the knowledge areas 
applicable to their goals. 
 
2. CSEC2017  
 
The term “cybersecurity professional” is 
ambiguous [9]. While it designates a worker in the 
field of cybersecurity, the skills and knowledge that 
such a professional is expected to have varies wildly 
among jobs. One who sets security policy need not 
understand precisely how the technology works, or the 
Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman theorem of the undecidability 
of security, but that person should know the limits of 
what the technology can do and what is feasible to 
require of both people and systems. A security 
administrator need not understand the laws and 
regulations that underlie the security policies the 
system is to enforce, but she must understand how the 
technology works and how to install and configure it to 
enforce those policies (or say what cannot be 
enforced). A cybersecurity professor needs to know the 
Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman theorem as well as the 
principles underlying cybersecurity and their 
application in technology. Thus, the term 
“cybersecurity profession” is generic and not specific – 
really, it should be “cybersecurity professions”. 
A cybersecurity professional typically completes a 
curriculum to obtain a degree or certification, and then 
practices her work for some period of time. This raises 
the issue of what an appropriate cybersecurity 
curriculum should cover. Given the wide range of jobs 
that cybersecurity professionals undertake, no single 
curriculum can serve all needs. Yet there are certain 
underlying themes common to all cybersecurity 
professions that any cybersecurity curriculum must 
cover. The depth, time spent, and knowledge, skills, 
and abilities in these themes depend upon the goals of 
the particular curriculum. 
The CSEC2017’s goals speak to this need. It is to 
provide curricular guidance that is comprehensive 
enough to support a wide range of disciplines and 
competencies. This guidance is to be grounded in the 
basic principles of cybersecurity, yet be flexible 
enough to accommodate educational programs with 
differing needs, and enable them to evolve as the field 
of cybersecurity, and the needs of the workforce, also 
evolve.  
In order to achieve this goal, the JTF is composed 
of cybersecurity experts from academia, industry, and 
government. They work in both technical and non-
technical disciplines. In addition to international 
representation on the JTF, a Global Advisory Board 
provides input to make the guidelines useful to non-
United States institutions and programs. Working 
groups include educators and practitioners from all 
over the world who have experience in the particular 
knowledge areas on which they are working. 
The structure of the CSEC2017 model consists of 
four parts: 
 
 Knowledge areas; 
 Crosscutting concepts; 
 Disciplinary lenses; and 
 Application areas. 
 
2.1. Knowledge Areas 
 
Knowledge areas (KAs) organize the knowledge of 
cybersecurity. Figure 1 shows their structure. 
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 Figure 1. The structure of the knowledge areas. The same topic may appear under different 
knowledge units; this simply gives a different emphasis for the topic. 
 
The JTF has identified eight such areas: 
1. The data security KA covers the protection of 
data both when stationary and during 
transmission. 
2. The software security KA covers the 
development, deployment, operation, 
maintenance, and decommissioning of 
software in such a way that desired security 
and robustness properties are maintained 
throughout the software life cycle. 
3. The component security KA deals with the 
security of components and their manufacture 
and fabrication, including the supply chain 
and interfaces. 
4. The connection security KA deals with the 
connection of components; this includes the 
physical media used in transmission, network 
services, and network security. 
5. The system security KA deals with the 
security of the system as a whole, such as the 
composition of components, authentication, 
system architectures, and the security of 
specialized systems such as embedded and 
autonomous systems and the Internet of 
Things. 
6. The human security KA looks at protecting 
the data, and through that the privacy, of 
people. 
7. The organizational security KA focuses on 
the protection of organizations from threats 
that impede their accomplishing their mission. 
8. The societal security KA treats cybersecurity 
aspects that affect society at large, such as 
cyberlaw and cybercrime, ethics, professional 
and social responsibility, and intellectual 
property. 
 
These knowledge areas are not mutually exclusive. 
A knowledge unit may sit in more than one KA, in 
which case the KA it is in drives the way one looks at 
the unit. For example, a knowledge unit on 
cryptography certainly falls into the data security KA 
because it is central to the protection of data. It also 
falls into the system security KA because cryptography 
is used to authenticate components of a system (for 
example, by using and validating digital signatures). 
Finally, the use of cryptography has societal 
implications—witness the debate about whether “back 
doors” should be embedded in products—and for this 
aspect would fall under the societal security KA. 
Each knowledge unit groups topics of a single 
theme together. These knowledge units in turn are 
made up of topics, each of which has an associated set 
of learning outcomes. Topics may fall under multiple 
knowledge units, and learning objectives may also fall 
under multiple topics. 
 
2.2. Cross-Cutting Concepts 
 
The cross-cutting concepts connect the knowledge 
areas. They emphasize key concepts common to all 
aspects of cybersecurity. The model has five such 
concepts. 
1. Confidentiality rules limit access to data and 
resources. 
2. Integrity rules aim to provide assurance that 
data and resources are trustworthy. 
3. Availability rules ensure that access to data or 
resources meet quality of service 
requirements. 
4. Risk deals with threats from the environment 
and from adversaries. 
5. Adversarial thinking considers how an 
adversary might hinder or thwart obtaining 
the desired result. 
For example, consider confidentiality. It is clearly a 
key component of the data security, connection 
security, system security, and organizational security 
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KAs. It is a component of the human security KA in 
the guise of privacy, among other things. And it affects 
societal security through a combination of the above, 
so would also be in the societal security KA. Finally, 
its importance to the software security KA lies in the 
protection of sensitive data such as passwords, and 
indeed the use of obfuscation to protect the software 
itself.  
 
2.3. Disciplinary Lenses 
 
The disciplinary lenses provide the approach, depth, 
and learning outcomes for each knowledge unit that are 
appropriate for a particular discipline. For example, 
consider an enterprise architecture. A non-technical 
discipline (such as pre-law) would examine the effect 
and consequences of legislation involving computer 
technology. That discipline would require an 
understanding of what technology can, and cannot, do 
to inform how the laws should be written and what the 
effects of the laws would be (or are).  It would not 
require a detailed knowledge of how the components 
making up the technology in question work. An 
information systems student would emphasize how the 
security policies derived from (among other things) 
legislation and regulations affects the protection of 
data. Thus, she would need to know details of the 
configuration and management of the technology, but 
not the effects or consequences of specific legislation. 
Finally, a computer science major would need to know 
how the components of the system work, with 
management and legal issues being weighted much less 
heavily than in the pre-law program. 
The disciplines in the model are based on those 
identified by the ACM: 
 
1. The computer science discipline covers the 
development of software, ways to use 
computers to solve problems, and new ways 
to use computers. 
2. The computer engineering discipline looks at 
designing and implementing computing 
devices. 
3. The information systems discipline explores 
the uses of information processing technology 
in enterprises, with an emphasis on the use of 
information on those systems. 
4. The information technology discipline is 
similar to that of information systems, but 
focuses on the technology rather than the use 
of information on that technology. 
5. The software engineering discipline deals 
with defining, developing, implementing, 
testing, maintaining software 
6. Finally, the other disciplinary majors includes 
other disciplines, with elements chosen from 
the above disciplines as appropriate. 
 
2.4. Application Areas 
 
Application areas link cybersecurity curricular 
elements to professional practice. They filter the 
knowledge, skills, and abilities gleaned through 
appropriate disciplinary lenses to frameworks used in 
professional societies and the workforce. Specifically, 
they define the breadth and depth of coverage expected 
for each core idea in the particular profession or job. 
 
The seven application areas are: 
1. Public policy covers managers such as 
executive management, legislators, regulators, 
and other public and private personnel who 
develop or affect cybersecurity policy. 
2. Procurement covers those who purchase or 
otherwise acquire information technology, 
and hire the people who will work with it. 
They must understand the cybersecurity 
considerations involved in such procurement 
and hiring, including risk management and 
assurance with respect to the mission of the 
systems and people. 
3. Management refers to those who administer 
the systems and the environment necessary to 
support the systems, users, and administrators. 
Cybersecurity considerations include business 
continuity matters, managing identity and 
authorization, and incident handling. 
4. Software development involves ensuring the 
software meets requirements, including those 
aimed at compliance with policy, laws, and 
regulations, and that it is robust. This includes 
testing the software as well as maintaining it 
and developing patches and updates as 
needed. 
5. IT security operations focuses on the 
operation of the systems in such a way that 
they meet cybersecurity requirements. 
Practitioners must be able to translate policy 
into operational procedures, and be able to 
configure systems and networks to this end. 
6. Enterprise architecture refers to the 
aggregation of all technology in the 
enterprise, as well as their operation and 
management. It covers elements from the 
above five application areas. 
7. Finally, research in cybersecurity requires an 
understanding of access control and the three 
general properties, namely confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability. Beyond these, the 
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specific topic(s) of research dictate what else 
a researcher should know, and in what depth. 
A researcher in network security needs to 
know how networks are used in practice to 
determine how best to design an intrusion 
detection system to gather data for analysis, 
but does not need to know the proof of the 
Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman theorem. However, a 
researcher in the foundations of computer 
security needs to know both the theorem and 
its proof, but not how networks are used in 
practice.  
 
These application areas are preliminary, and may 
change as the CSEC2017 undergoes refinement. 
 
2.5. Summary 
 
It is critical to understand that CSEC2017 is not a 
curriculum. For example, in the topic “cryptography”, 
the CSEC2017 does not say which algorithms should 
be taught. This is because the state of the art changes. 
In the 1970s, the Data Encryption Standard was 
considered state of the art; in the 2000s, it clearly is 
not. So it is left to the curriculum designers to 
instantiate the topics that they believe should be 
covered, and determine what exactly should be taught 
to satisfy the needs of their specific curriculum. 
The contents of the CSEC2017 are being validated 
through comparison with existing bodies of knowledge 
and curricula. For example, the Fundamental Principles 
knowledge unit in the Software Security KA has been 
compared to numerous software vulnerabilities lists, 
including the OWASP Top Ten Most Critical Web 
Application Security Risks and the IEEE Cyber 
Security document Avoiding the Top 10 Software 
Security Design Flaws [7, 13]. As the practice and 
documentation knowledge units are fleshed out, they 
will again be compared to these (and other) documents, 
as well as various course syllabi involving secure 
software development. Other KAs will proceed 
similarly. 
The CSEC2017 is a work in progress. Undoubtedly 
it will change before being finalized. For example, the 
systems security KA is likely to be split into two or 
more knowledge areas because its scope is so large, or 
the scope may be narrowed. The JTF is actively 
discussing both possibilities.1  
Even when finalized, the CSEC2017 will need to be 
updated as cybersecurity education, and cybersecurity 
                                                 
1 Indeed, the original system security KA has been split into the 
component security, connection security, and system security KAs 
shown above between the writing of the submitted version and final 
version of this paper. 
professions, evolve. This is expected, and the intent is 
to provide a sound basis both for curricular 
development and the evolution of the guidelines. 
 
3. CAE KU Project  
 
In 1997, the U.S. National Security Agency 
designated 7 schools in the United States as Centers of 
Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 
Education (CAE-IAE). Other schools were designated 
in successive years, and soon the criteria for such 
designation was that the academic program had to meet 
criteria defined by U.S. national training standards 
CNSS 4011 and at least additional such standard. 
Academic institutions pushed back against this 
criteria, pointing out the difference between training 
and academic education — both are appropriate, but 
the four-year institutions focus on the latter rather than 
the former [2]. In part because of this, the National 
Security Agency and the Department of Homeland 
Security (which had joined to co-lead the CAE 
program) began to focus on what should be in a 
curriculum in order to educate a cybersecurity worker. 
In 2014, the criteria for designation was revised 
radically, around the educational elements associated 
with cybersecurity. These curricular components, the 
Knowledge Units, covered specific topics to be taught 
by institutions using the KUs. Being designated a 
CAE-CD (the new name for what was a CAE-IAE) 
now required the institution to cover the material in a 
set of basic KUs and selected optional KUs that 
described their academic program content.  In addition, 
two-year academic institutions such as Community 
Colleges could now also be designated CAE-2Y, 
indicating they also satisfied a set of KUs. How the 
institution taught the specific topics was up to the 
institution — but all the material in a KU had to be 
covered. 
 Although this initial set of KUs was developed as a 
result of a series of information gathering meetings 
where academics provided input into the content of the 
KUs, many academic institutions felt the KUs were 
inadequate. In 2016 the U.S. National Science 
Foundation funded a project to create a social 
community and wiki to update the KUs.  
The result of this KU refinement has been a 
broadening of the information describing a knowledge 
unit. What began as a name, a description, and a list of 
topics and outcomes, has been expanded to include 
many additional elements such as a vocabulary, a 
connection to the NIST NICE Job Tasks, and 
connection to industry certifications. On the current 
schedule, the next set of KUs will be submitted to the 
program office at NSA in the fall of 2017 for use in 
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2018, although the program will continue to refine and 
develop the KUs for future releases. 
The objective of the KU project is simple: to 
provide a set of prescriptive elements that can be used 
to assess a program with respect to academic content 
elements. The way this works begins with each 
institution defining what their educational outcome 
objectives are with respect to their cybersecurity 
program. With the field being so broad, programs need 
to specialize in some aspect of the discipline, and from 
there define the curriculum that will produce graduates 
aligned with these objectives. The Centers of 
Academic Excellence program allows programs to 
define their academic program in the form of a series 
of core (mandatory) knowledge units, supported by a 
larger set of elective KUs to shape the curriculum 
objectives to the school’s objectives.  Assessors can 
then assess the mapping of the school’s academic work 
to the chosen set of KUs to determine whether a 
program is satisfactorily comprehensive on the 
academic side.  There are additional programmatic 
elements, and the program office will consider the 
package as a whole to determine whether the 
institution’s cybersecurity program meets the standards 
of a Center of Academic Excellence. 
The key to the assessment of the academic program 
comes from the comprehensiveness of the KUs, and 
this content is in the hands of academics.  As 
academics improve the comprehensive nature of the 
KUs through the refinement project, they will more 
closely represent the actual needs of an organization 
with respect to content that has both an education 
component and a workforce development and training 
component, making program assessment easier, and 
more meaningful. 
 
4. Contrasting the CSEC2017 and CAE 
KU Projects  
 
Both CSEC2017 and the CAE KU project have 
knowledge units, and this has caused many in the 
academic community to question how these projects 
differ and ask which they should back.  
Indeed, both projects have Knowledge Units, and 
over time, these two knowledge bases are expected to 
converge. They are being developed by different 
groups at the present time, and while the groups, and 
the goals of the groups, are different, both efforts are 
open to public input and cross pollination is and will 
continue to occur. But this is really a minor aspect and 
ignores the bigger question.  How are they different 
and what does that mean to a faculty member? 
CSEC2017 is an effort to develop comprehensive 
curricular guidance in cybersecurity education that will 
support future program development. Again, it is not a 
curriculum document, but the basis for developing 
curriculum documents. Those documents will draw 
upon the contents of CSEC2017, the specific 
requirements of the academic institution or group 
developing the curriculum, and sources within the 
industries and organizations that hire current graduates 
of the program. As the curricular guidance contains the 
necessary information for any and all curricula in the 
cybersecurity disciplines, it is up to the curriculum 
developers to select the topics, decide upon an 
instantiation of those topics, the way those topics are to 
be covered, and in what depth they should be covered, 
for a specific program. In this way, the curriculum 
developer can create a curriculum that is both 
academically sound and that gives graduates the 
practical aspects they need to succeed. 
The CAE KU project has an entirely different 
focus. Its goal is to provide a basis for recommending 
programs as meeting the needs of educating 
cybersecurity workers. Like CSEC2017, it recognizes 
the need for flexibility, in that no single program meets 
the needs of all cybersecurity professionals. So it 
provides a set of KUs, topics, and outcomes that 
schools can map their programs into (and, if necessary, 
add material from) to demonstrate they are meeting the 
criteria for a CAE. No program would use all of the 
KU’s, or even more than a small fraction for that 
matter. In other words, what has to happen is that the 
program pick from the set of KUs the appropriate ones 
to describe their program. 
The first step is to decide what your cybersecurity 
program attempts to accomplish. From there, the 
CSEC2017 effort will help you develop a sound 
comprehensive curriculum, and the CAE KU effort 
provides a means to describe the program to the CAE 
office. What is most important in the near term is that 
both the CSEC2017 and CAE KU efforts will be 
ongoing and need academic input to properly refine 
them towards their objectives. 
 
5. Future Efforts 
 
Both the CSEC2017 and CAE KU effort will be 
ongoing as future revisions of both projects will further 
clarify and refine the outputs of the two efforts. And 
over time, the KU portion of both projects may in fact 
become aligned, but that is several revisions in the 
future. And all of this effort is occurring in the rapidly 
changing environment of cybersecurity.  The US 
government has produced the National Initiative for 
Cybersecurity Education National Cybersecurity 
Workforce Framework (NCWF), a third generation 
attempt at documenting the workforce needs in 
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cybersecurity in a notional framework. Over time, this 
effort too, will have to shift and move as the field of 
cybersecurity advances. In the interim, there is a need 
for all three elements, the Center of Academic 
Excellence program, the CSEC2017 initiative and the 
NCWF, for each comes at different problems, from 
different angles and provides crucial information to 
further define and develop the needed academic 
programs to address a workforce shortage. 
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